Friday, March 13, 2015

Kentucky Law 101:1

Kentucky Law 101

written by Johnathan Masters

Criminal Record Background Check of Johnathan Daniel Masters: http://young4ky.blogspot.com/2015/03/expungement-eligibility-certification.html

Here's the 5 Accusations Joseph P. Derp http://young4ky.blogspot.com/2015/02/joe-gerths-7-lies-about-johnathan.html leveled at me, without questioning any of them:

1-A Turd Bitched Out of a Fight He Started aka Abuse of a Teacher in Breckinridge County

2-Spalding University's Grand Theft, Sexual Harassment, and Terroristic Threatening Against Me aka Harassment Communications and Terroristic Threatening in Jefferson County, Kentucky

3-Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in Henry County, Kentucky aka Ooops

4-Undercover Criminal LMPD Beatdown and Jailer Penetration Against Good Samaritan Walking to the Store a block away from Home aka December 2012 Menacing in Jefferson County, Kentucky

5-“The Golf Club Incident” aka 2009 Harassment Communcations Plea Bargain

xxx

1Abuse of a Teacher in Breckinridge County aka a Turd Bitched Out of a Fight He Started

“He is accused of screaming at a school principal and threatening to harm him during a verbal altercation in December, according to Jefferson District Judge Sean Delahanty.” ~Courier-Urinal

A 1 Minute Argument with a George Costanza-twin in Cloverport:


I would still like to see how Kentuckians would do on the Civics exam. It's only 10 questions, and if one can't pass a basic Civics exam (getting 6 questions correct), which all newly Christianed American immigrants have to pass, then they should just shut up about immigration, since they know more about how our democratic government functions better than you do.

Also, there's zero democratization in American government schools.



Abuse of teacher prohibited. Whenever a teacher or school administrator is functioning in his capacity as an employee of a board of education of a public school system, it shall be unlawful for any person to direct speech or conduct toward the teacher or school administrator when such person knows or should know that the speech or conduct will disrupt or interfere with normal school activities or will nullify or undermine the good order and discipline of the school.”

Effective:July 13, 1990 History: Repealed and reenacted 1990 Ky. Acts ch. 476, Pt. V, sec. 483, effective July 13, 1990. -- Amended 1986 Ky. Acts ch. 255, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1986. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 4503-8.

xxx

2Harassment Communications and Terroristic Threatening in Jefferson County, Kentucky aka Spalding University's Grand Theft, Sexual Harassment, and Terroristic Threatening Against Me

“He is accused of making profanity-laced calls to former Spalding Associate Dean Elizabeth Lodge Rogers demanding that she return money to him after he was kicked out of the school's Master of Arts in Teaching program, according to court records. He also made profane videos that he posted on YouTube that criticized Rogers and Spalding University after he was dismissed. In one video, he said, “Are you looking to be a bossy, untalented, unethical, immoral, authoritarian, totalitarian, fascist, Nazi, piece of shit, come to Spalding University. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dfy2GpkOgA” ~Josef Derp

508.075 Terroristic threatening in the first degree. 508.075 Terroristic threatening in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of terroristic threatening in the first degree when he or she: (a) Intentionally makes false statements that he or she or another person has placed a weapon of mass destruction on: 1. The real property or any building of any public or private elementary or secondary school, vocational school, or institution of postsecondary education; 2. A school bus or other vehicle owned, operated, or leased by a school; 3. The real property or any building public or private that is the site of an official school-sanctioned function; or 4. The real property or any building owned or leased by a government agency; or (b) Intentionally and without lawful authority, places a counterfeit weapon of mass destruction at any location or on any object specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection. (2) A counterfeit weapon of mass destruction is placed with lawful authority if it is placed, with the written permission of the chief officer of the school or other institution, as a part of an official training exercise and is placed by a public servant, as defined in KRS 522.010. (3) A person is not guilty of commission of an offense under this section if he or she, innocently and believing the information to be true, communicates a threat made by another person to school personnel, a peace officer, a law enforcement agency, a public agency involved in emergency response, or a public safety answering point and identifies the person from whom the threat was communicated, if known. (4) Terroristic threatening in the first degree is a Class C felony. Effective:June 21, 2001 History: Created 2001 Ky. Acts ch. 113, sec. 1, effective June 21, 2001. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=19736

These terroristic threatening statutes were changed before 9-11. Also, I recall a police officer making a joke about charging somebody who was yelling “terroristic threatening”, because it has such a vague definition, anybody for any reason could be charged with it. It's like “disorderly conduct”, and “harassment communications”... they're asshole laws that asshole cops hit somebody with... not because they were criminal, but because the cop didn't like them for some reason... such as laughing at the initial questions in the investigation of a missing library book.

508.078 Terroristic threatening in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of terroristic threatening in the second degree when, other than as provided in KRS 508.075, he or she intentionally: (a) With respect to a school function, threatens to commit any act likely to result in death or serious physical injury to any student group, teacher, volunteer worker, or employee of a public or private elementary or secondary school, vocational school, or institution of postsecondary education, or to any other person reasonably expected to lawfully be on school property or at a school-sanctioned activity, if the threat is related to their employment by a school, or work or attendance at school, or a school function. A threat directed at a person or persons or at a school does not need to identify a specific person or persons or school in order for a violation of this section to occur; (b) Makes false statements that he or she has placed a weapon of mass destruction at any location other than one specified in KRS 508.075; or (c) Without lawful authority places a counterfeit weapon of mass destruction at any location other than one specified in KRS 508.075. (2) A counterfeit weapon of mass destruction is placed with lawful authority if it is placed as part of an official training exercise by a public servant, as defined in KRS 522.010. (3) A person is not guilty of commission of an offense under this section if he or she, innocently and believing the information to be true, communicates a threat made by another person to school personnel, a peace officer, a law enforcement agency, a public agency involved in emergency response, or a public safety answering point and identifies the person from whom the threat was communicated, if known. (4) Terroristic threatening in the second degree is a Class D felony. Effective:June 21, 2001 History: Created 2001 Ky. Acts ch. 113, sec. 2, effective June 21, 2001. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=19737

508.080 Terroristic threatening in the third degree. (1) Except as provided in KRS 508.075 or 508.078, a person is guilty of terroristic threatening in the third degree when: (a) He threatens to commit any crime likely to result in death or serious physical injury to another person or likely to result in substantial property damage to another person; or (b) He intentionally makes false statements for the purpose of causing evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation. (2) Terroristic threatening in the third degree is a Class A misdemeanor. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=19738

To treat “terroristic threatening” so trivially, it delegitimizes it's intended purpose. The law is there to catch those who would fly planes into our buildings in a suicide attack. I challenged another independent sovereign citizen to a boxing match. It was just a question... a question I asked a thief, a swindler, a fake teacher/administrator, who stole $60,000+ from me, which is Grand Theft, who stole two stellar years of Graduate School, who ignored my two complaints about sexual harassment, and terroristic threatening against me: http://thefreedomskool.blogspot.com/2014/10/the-perversion-of-spalding-university.html

525.080 Harassing communications.

  1. A person is guilty of harassing communications when, with intent to intimidate, harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telegraph, mail, or any other form of written communication in a manner which causes annoyance or alarm and serves no purpose of legitimate communication; (b) Makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication; or (c) Communicates, while enrolled as a student in a local school district, with or about another school student, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, the Internet, telegraph, mail, or any other form of electronic or written communication in a manner which a reasonable person under the circumstances should know would cause the other student to suffer fear of physical harm, intimidation, humiliation, or embarrassment and which serves no purpose of legitimate communication.
  2. Harassing communications is a Class B misdemeanor. Effective:July 15, 2008 History: Amended 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 125, sec. 5, effective July 15, 2008. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 218, effective January 1, 1975. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/Statutes/statute.aspx?id=19927

xxx

3Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in Henry County, Kentucky

“In 2013 he was convicted in Henry County of possessing drug paraphernalia and ordered to pay a $150 fine.” ~Joseph Burp

A KSP trooper pulled me over for speeding 85 mph in a 55 zone, at night, about 9pm or so, found a 3 inch green marijuana bowl inside my vehicle, confiscated it, and then searched me and the vehicle thoroughly with dogs and another KSP trooper. They ticketed me, and I pled guilty, though I shouldn't have. At the very least, I should have pleaded “No Contest”... but really, only “Not Guilty” gives you any rights whatsoever in court. The Judge in Henry County didn't offer “no contest” as an option during the arraignment. Retail shops can sell smoke pipes, but you can't own one? Also, if they had charged me with a marijuana possession charge, I could have gotten a diversion option, where I do community service for a “Not guilty” or a dismissal of all charges without prejudice... but since it was a smoke pipe... I'm not able to get it expunged until 5 years after the fact. The District Court Judge made it seem like I could have expunged off my record right away.


“Definitions for KRS 218A.500 and 218A.510 -- Unlawful practices -- Penalties. As used in this section and KRS 218A.510: (1) "Drug paraphernalia" means all equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. It includes but is not limited to: (a) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived; (b) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, or preparing controlled substances; (c) Isomerization devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in increasing the potency of any species of plant which is a controlled substance; (d) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness or purity of controlled substances; (e) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled substances; (f) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose and lactose, used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting controlled substances; (g) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining marijuana; (h) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons, and mixing devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in compounding controlled substances; (i) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, intended for use, or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances; (j) Containers and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing controlled substances; (k) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled substances into the human body; and (l) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing marijuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body, such as: metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashishheads, or punctured metal bowls; water pipes; carburetion tubes and devices; smoking and carburetion masks; roach clips which mean objects used to hold burning material, such as marijuana cigarettes, that have become too small or too short to be held in the hand; miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials; chamber pipes; carburetor pipes; electric pipes; air-driven pipes; chillums; bongs; ice pipes or chillers. (2) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packing, repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. (3) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. (4) It is unlawful for any person to place in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that the purpose of the advertisement, in whole or in part, is to promote the sale of objects designed or intended for use as drug paraphernalia. (5) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. Effective:April 26, 2010 History: Amended 2010 Ky. Acts ch. 149, sec. 14, effective April 13, 2010; and ch. 160, sec. 14, effective April 26, 2010. -- Amended 1992 Ky. Acts ch. 441, sec. 8, effective July 14, 1992. -- Created 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 413, sec. 2, effective July 15, 1982. Legislative Research Commission Note (4/26/2010). This section was amended by 2010 Ky. Acts chs. 149 and 160, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.”


xxx

4December 2012 Menacing in Jefferson County, Kentucky

“He was charged with resisting arrest, assault, menacing and disorderly conduct following an incident in which he allegedly charged at a Louisville Metro Police officer and struck him in the face.
Masters was ultimately convicted of menacing, a misdemeanor, and ordered to pay $385 in fines and court costs.” ~a Gatewood Galbraith hater

“Menacing”? I was attacked just for walking down 4th Street. I was virtually jumped in my own backyard by plain clothes, plain car LMPD for absolutely no reason: http://thefreedomskool.blogspot.com/2014/12/lmpd-viper-squad-attacks-good-samaritan.html

508.050 Menacing.

  1. A person is guilty of menacing when he intentionally places another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.
  2. Menacing is a Class B misdemeanor. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/Statutes/statute.aspx?id=19733
520.090 Resisting Arrest:

  1. A person is guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer, recognized to be acting under color of his official authority, from effecting an arrest of the actor or another by: (a) Using or threatening to use physical force or violence against the peace officer or another; or (b) Using any other means creating a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer or another.
  2. Resisting arrest is a Class A misdemeanor.

Resisting Arrest is a crime in KY: a Class A misdemeanor carrying up to 365 days in jail, a max fine up to $500.00, plus court costs of approx. $135.00.

508.010 Assault in the first degree.

  1. A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (a) He intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (b) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person.
  2. Assault in the first degree is a Class B felony. Effective: January 1, 1975 History: Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 65, effective January 1, 1975. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=19730

525.055 Disorderly conduct in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct in the first degree when he or she: (a) In a public place and with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or wantonly creating a risk thereof: 1. Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; 2. Makes unreasonable noise; or 3. Creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose; and (b) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a) of this subsection within three hundred (300) feet of a: 1. Cemetery during a funeral or burial; 2. Funeral home during the viewing of a deceased person; 3. Funeral procession; 4. Funeral or memorial service; or 5. Building in which a funeral or memorial service is being conducted; and (c) Acts in a way described in paragraph (a) of this subsection at any point in time between one (1) hour prior to the commencement of an event specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection and one (1) hour following its conclusion; and (d) Knows that he or she is within three hundred (300) feet of an occasion described in paragraph (b) of this subsection. (2) Disorderly conduct in the first degree is a Class A misdemeanor. Effective:June 26, 2007 History: Amended 2007 Ky. Acts ch. 107, sec. 2, effective June 26, 2007. -- Created 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 50, sec. 1, effective March 27, 2006; and ch. 51, sec. 1, effective March 27, 2006. Legislative Research Commission Note (3/27/2006). This section was created by 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 50, sec. 1, and 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 51, sec. 1, which are substantially identical and have been codified together http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=19924

525.060 Disorderly conduct in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct in the second degree when in a public place and with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or wantonly creating a risk thereof, he: (a) Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; (b) Makes unreasonable noise; (c) Refuses to obey an official order to disperse issued to maintain public safety in dangerous proximity to a fire, hazard, or other emergency; or (d) Creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose. (2) Disorderly conduct in the second degree is a Class B misdemeanor. Effective:March 27, 2006 History: Amended 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 50, sec. 2, effective March 27, 2006; and ch. 51, sec. 2, effective March 27, 2006. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 216, effective January 1, 1975. Legislative Research Commission Note (3/27/2006). This section was amended by 2006 Ky. Acts chs. 50 and 51, which are identical and have been codified together. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/Statutes/statute.aspx?id=19925

xxx

5-2009 Harassment Communcations Plea Bargain aka “The Golf Club Incident”

“He was charged in Gallatin County with assault of his father and harassing communications, and had a domestic violence order sworn out against him. He pleaded guilty to harassing communications and was ordered to pay court costs of $153 and a $300 fine, which was discharged as long as he didn't violate the domestic violence order.” ~Joe Gerth

RAW video footage of the incident (mostly audio): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuv5b68WiFM

525.080 Harassing communications.

  1. A person is guilty of harassing communications when, with intent to intimidate, harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telegraph, mail, or any other form of written communication in a manner which causes annoyance or alarm and serves no purpose of legitimate communication; (b) Makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication; or (c) Communicates, while enrolled as a student in a local school district, with or about another school student, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, the Internet, telegraph, mail, or any other form of electronic or written communication in a manner which a reasonable person under the circumstances should know would cause the other student to suffer fear of physical harm, intimidation, humiliation, or embarrassment and which serves no purpose of legitimate communication.
  2. Harassing communications is a Class B misdemeanor. Effective:July 15, 2008 History: Amended 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 125, sec. 5, effective July 15, 2008. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 218, effective January 1, 1975. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/Statutes/statute.aspx?id=19927

525.070 Harassment.

(1) A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to intimidate, harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects him to physical contact; (b) Attempts or threatens to strike, shove, kick, or otherwise subject the person to physical contact; (c) In a public place, makes an offensively coarse utterance, gesture, or display, or addresses abusive language to any person present; (d) Follows a person in or about a public place or places; (e) Engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose; or (f) Being enrolled as a student in a local school district, and while on school premises, on school-sponsored transportation, or at a school-sponsored event: 1. Damages or commits a theft of the property of another student; 2. Substantially disrupts the operation of the school; or 3. Creates a hostile environment by means of any gestures, written communications, oral statements, or physical acts that a reasonable person under the circumstances should know would cause another student to suffer fear of physical harm, intimidation, humiliation, or embarrassment.

(2) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection, harassment is a violation. (b) Harassment, as defined in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, is a Class B misdemeanor. Effective:July 15, 2008 History: Amended 2008 Ky. Acts ch. 125, sec. 4, effective July 15, 2008. -- Amended 1996 Ky. Acts ch. 345, sec. 3, effective July 15, 1996. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 217, effective January 1, 1975. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/Statutes/statute.aspx?id=19926

The 2009 charges are particularly interesting because that's over 6 years ago. If I was wealthy enough, I'd already have expunged that, and about 10 other bullshit charges on my criminal record.

This incident was my rite of passage, of which, was self-defense, and Gallatin County Judicial System protected a criminal who had assaulted and batterized me over 5,000 times before, for the first 18 years of my life, and on 9-9-9, he attacked me again, unprovoked, and then tried to murder me with a 9-iron. At a golf club fight, an iron is a better weapon than a wood.

xxx

Kentucky's “Stand Your Ground” Law:

KRS 503.070 Protection of another.

(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when: (a) The defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect a third person against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person; and (b) Under the circumstances as the defendant believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would himself have been justified under KRS 503.050 and 503.060 in using such protection.

(2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when: (a) The defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect a third person against imminent death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, or other felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055; and (b) Under the circumstances as they actually exist, the person whom he seeks to protect would himself have been justified under KRS 503.050 and 503.060 in using such protection. (3) A person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Effective:July 12, 2006 History: Amended 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 192, sec. 4, effective July 12, 2006. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 32, effective January 1, 1975. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=19672

xxx

KRS 61.916 Use of deadly force to make an arrest. A special law enforcement officer may, in the course of accomplishing any lawful arrest for a felony committed upon the public property as herein provided, use and apply that force which he believes is necessary to make the arrest, except that he may only use deadly force to make such an arrest if: (1) The officer, in making the arrest, is authorized to act as a special law enforcement officer; and (2) The arrest is for a felony involving the use or threatened use of physical force likely to cause death or serious physical injury; and (3) The officer believes that the person to be arrested is likely to endanger human life unless arrested without delay. Effective: January 1, 1977 History: Created 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 178, sec. 10, effective January 1, 1977.

xxx

1st Amendment to US Constitution:

Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.”

xxx

A study published in 2007 by the Supreme Court of California found that of all state supreme courts in the United States, the decisions of the Kentucky Supreme Court were the least followed by other states' appellate courts.

xxx

Section 1 of Kentucky's Constitution:

All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned:

First: The right of enjoying and defending [our] lives and liberties.

...

Third: The right of seeking and pursuing [our] safety and happiness.

Fourth: The right of freely communicating [our] thoughts and opinions.

Sixth: The right of assembling together in a peaceable manner for their common good, and of applying to those invested with the power of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.

Seventh: The right to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.”

xxx

Kentucky's Section 1 is “the broadest expression of the right to bare arms” (Holland v. Commonwealth, 1956)

xxx

Just recently, Kentucky's Supreme Court said that the practice of “shopping for judges” has to stop:

xxx

Mitch McConnell was guilty of a Class D Felony, but the Attorney General decided against prosecution, and none of the KSP arrested him for it.

KRS 119.155 Preventing voter from casting ballot -- Interfering with election.
(1) Any person who unlawfully prevents or attempts to prevent any voter from casting his ballot, or intimidates or attempts to intimidate any voter so as to prevent him from casting his ballot, or who unlawfully interferes with the election officers in the discharge of their duties, shall be guilty of a Class D felony. http://www.lrc.ky.gov/Statutes/statute.aspx?id=27752

xxx

Section 43 of Kentucky's Constitution:

The members of the General Assembly shall, in all cases except treason, felony, breach or surety of peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance on the sessions of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from same; and for any speech or debate in either House they shall not be questioned in any other place.”

Section 43 of Kentucky's Constitution allows all Senators and Representatives of the people to go around smoking marijuana, and other illegal, but not felonious illegal, crimes, while Frankfort is in session. I guess that would include prostitution as well. March 24 is the last day Frankfort representatives are allowed to collect as many unlimited misdemeanors at their heart's content.

While Kentucky's state representatives are drinking and driving all over Frankfort, meanwhile, I'm being thrown in the clink over a possibly false 2004 allegation that I failed to return a library book. I do remember the Boone County police went to my aunt's house looking for some “spy book”, but I don't have that book anymore. But that was in Walton, Kentucky, which is Boone County, not Kenton County. I won't deny the possibility that I may have forgotten to return a library book, but no specific book comes to mind. It definitely wasn't “taken” intentionally, if at all. I remember checking out Hunter S. Thompson's book called “Better Than Sex” in Walton, Kentucky. I had a pile of books in Bellevue, Kentucky, though I'm not sure if it's still there. For a duration, off and on, I was living in an abandoned building that was bought by several partners... it was supposed to be flipped... the apartments would be made habitable, and new residents would come in, and they'd be able to pay for the purchase with the rent money. Marvin Dryer was the owner of the building. He lived in Gallatin County for some time, but I'm not sure where Marvin is at these days. I worked at that building in exchange for my rent and stay there. It was 336 Fairfield Avenue, 41073. Across from my apartment building was Pasquale's Pizza, and Carry Out, and PNC bank on Fairfield Avenue, the main street that goes into Bellevue, and through it, and then eventually, last but not least, to Dayton. I worked at Joe's Crab Shack for about a week; with an antiques dealer, shoe shining old looking books; at United Dairy Farmers, scooping ice cream for the masses, and; I eventually worked up and out with American Self-Storage, in Ohio, a self-storage criminal corporation, who eventually completely screwed me over...

I also remember a Bellevue cop who roughed me up for no reason. I had a laundry basket in my hands, going home to my abandoned building. That cop locked me in the car for 2 hours, ransacked my apartment, finding nothing on me, finally let me go, but warned me, “If I ever see you around here again, I'll arrest you.” He gave me a business card to go to the homeless shelter, but instead, I nervously went back to my apartment. That was in 2001 or 2002. It was one of the first times I realized that the police didn't care about protecting and serving me.

xxx

Castle Law is also called the “Make My Day Law”. Castle Law is where you're allowed to shoot anybody breaking into your house. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Castle_doctrine

“No duty to retreat from dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle.”

503.055 Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle -- Exceptions. (1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if: (a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; and (b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. (2) The presumption set forth in subsection (1) of this section does not apply if: (a) The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner, lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person; (b) The person sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of the person against whom the defensive force is used; (c) The person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is using the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle to further an unlawful activity; or (d) The person against whom the defensive force is used is a peace officer, as defined in KRS 446.010, who enters or attempts to enter a dwelling, residence, or vehicle in the performance of his or her official duties, and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a peace officer. (3) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a felony involving the use of force. (4) A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person's dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. Effective:July 12, 2006 History: Created 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 192, sec. 2, effective July 12, 2006 http://www.lrc.ky.gov/statutes/statute.aspx?id=19670

xxx


The court ruled 2-1, that a man acted in self-defense when he stabbed another man outside a night club in northern Kentucky back in 2008. The one against it, Judge Kelly Thompson from Bowling Green.

“I dissented, which is like asking the Supreme Court to take the case and tell us for sure. We really had an argument over the standard and burden the Commonwealth has to overcome that new statute 'stand your ground',” said Kentucky Court of Appeals Judge Kelly Thompson.

There's a law in Kentucky called the 'castle law' and Judge Thompson thinks this instance is a bit of a stretch. “It's gone out into bar parking lot brawls, and I don't think the law was really intended to go this far,” said Thompson.

How much do people really know about self-defense laws in Kentucky?

“Unless you have been through training such as that or you have had some special interest in studying the law, you may not know of the specific coverage of the castle law, and what it's intended to protect,” said attorney Phil Kimbel.

Kimbel teaches a concealed carry class telling people about self-defense.

He said it boils down to a basic point.

“The castle law says if you're confronted with serious bodily injury or death in your home, or in general circumstances of life, that you can defend yourself though against that threat,” said Kimbel.

However, the threat isn't always crystal clear as shown in the case where Judge Thompson dissented.
Judge Thompson says this case will likely go before the Kentucky Supreme Court for a ruling as part of a case they choose to take.

Xxx

Kentucky self defense laws explain that approaching someone's car in this situation is not illegal, but could lead to a deadly situation.

“When you are going to pull a gun on someone you have to be prepared and understand that you may have to use it,” says Kentucky conceal carry instructor Deborah Williams.

Williams explains this to students the first minute of every class.

Before 2006, Kentuckians were required to retreat in a deadly situation where someone was threatening them.

When the Castle Law was passed, it became legal for residents to use a deadly weapon if they felt they were in a life-threatening situation.

Williams was a co-writer on the Castle Law.

“You could meet deadly force with deadly force. You could not use it for example, with someone calling you names or someone that is just saying they are going to do something as far as beating you up, hitting you in the face or anything like that, you couldn't necessarily use deadly force,” Williams says.

The law says the person has the right to retreat from deadly situation, but has the option to use deadly force.

The Kentucky Castle Law also permits a person to use deadly force in cases of rape. http://www.wbko.com/home/headlines/The-Kentucky-Castle-Law-Explains-Your-Rights-In-Life-Threatening-Situations-200523671.html

xxxxxxxxxxx

Open carry is permissible in Kentucky.

Places in Kentucky where firearms cannot be carried, with or without a permit, include:

Xxx

According to Kentucky's Castle Law, those Occupiers in tents on the lawns were within their rights to defend themselves via Kentucky's Castle Law.

Two definitions were added to KRS 503.010 as a result of the Castle Doctrine, and the definition of “dwelling” in subsection 2 was modified. The definition of dwelling now “means a building or conveyance of any kind, including any attached porch, whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night.” This change now does not specify that the structure actually be occupied, only that it must be able to be occupied by people overnight. A definition for “residence” was added – “a dwelling in which a person resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as an invited guest.” This broadens the prior provision that presumed that an individual could only use deadly force to defend their own dwelling. The final definition added is that of “vehicle,” which states it is “a conveyance of any kind, whether or not motorized, which is designed to transport people or property.” This would cover automobiles, boats, aircraft, buses, trains and anything propelled by muscle power, which would include animal drawn vehicles and bicycles. Self protection The use of physical force in self protection is provided for in KRS 503.050. Subsection 2 provides for justification in using deadly force in self protection. As modified by the Castle Doctrine, it reads as follows, with the changes underlined: The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055. Two circumstances have been added under which a person may be justified in using deadly force for self protection. The first is if the defendant believes he is being threatened with a felony involving the use of force. This broad language includes felonies in which the person may or may not be in danger of death or serious physical injury. These would include, but not be limited to, second-degree assault, third-degree assault, first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree robbery, second-degree robbery and assault of a sports official. In all of these crimes, the victim might perceive himself to be in danger of death, serious physical injury, kidnapping or forcible sexual interco

Defensive force KRS 503.055, which addresses the use of defensive force, is a significant, but potentially confusing, addition to Chapter 503. To a certain degree, however, it is redundant, merely restating justifications already set forth elsewhere in the chapter. One issue it creates is that it uses the term “great bodily harm,” but provides no definition for the phrase. The term “serious physical injury” is defined in KRS 500.080(15) as “physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” Physical injury is defined in KRS 500.080(13) as “substantial physical pain or any impairment of physical condition.” The courts will have to apply some meaning to the term “great bodily harm.” Logically, it cannot mean exactly the same thing as the definition of serious physical injury, although, in states that use that phrase, it is obvious the meaning is essentially the same. Kentucky law presumes the use of different phrases or terms to indicate different meanings. Since one aspect of serious physical injury is that a person could die as a result of it, logically there is no injury more serious than that. Furthermore, since physical injury covers any impairment of physical condition, however minor, that is presumably the lowest level of harm. The use of the word “great” in the term plainly intends a significant injury. Therefore, great bodily harm may be interpreted by the courts to mean some level of injury between physical injury and serious physical injury. What the courts may conclude great bodily harm means could greatly affect which uses of force are found to be justified and which are not. http://www.kledispatches.ky.gov/Schwendeman-Castle%20doctrine-EDITED.pdf

Reasonable fear KRS 503.055(1) states that: [a] person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm to himself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if: (a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle or if that person has removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle; and (b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred. The next subsection of that statute sets forth exceptions to the above presumption. In these exceptions, the person using force will not have the benefit of presumption if the person against whom the defensive force was used falls into one of the categories listed in Subsection 2. These categories include (a) a person who “has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner, lessee or titleholder,” and there is no domestic violence order or pretrial release order or any sort of no contact order; (b) “[t]he person sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of, the person against whom the defensive force is used”; (c) the actor using defensive force is engaged in unlawful activity or using the dwelling, residence or vehicle to further an unlawful activity; or (d) the person against whom the defensive force is used is a peace officer “who enters or attempts to enter a dwelling, residence, or vehicle in the performance of his or her official duties, and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a peace officer.”

No duty to retreat A person who is not engaged in any sort of unlawful activity who is attacked in any place he has a lawful right to be, does not have a duty to retreat and may stand his ground and meet force with force, according to KRS 503.055(3). This includes the right to use deadly force if he or she “reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another, or to prevent the commission of a felony involving the use of force.” This codifies and elaborates upon what Kentucky case law generally held, which was that there was no duty to retreat when confronted by a threat. However, it did not add anything to the existing state of the law in Kentucky regarding a person having no duty to retreat in self protection. In Gibson v. Commonwealth,1 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, then Kentucky’s highest court, held that a self defense instruction to a jury was wrong because it included language that they had to find the defendant had no reasonable means of escaping in order to claim justified self defense. The Court stated: “It is the tradition that a Kentuckian never runs. He does not have to.”2 Subsequent cases generally have upheld the “no duty to retreat” ruling, but did not require it to be included in jury instructions when a defendant claimed to be acting in self protection.3 The fourth subsection addresses burglars, stating that “[A] person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.” This subsection codifies and broadens the existing presumption regarding burglars, their presumed felonious intent and the clear and present danger they pose to the occupants of the dwelling. Deadly force was thus justified in dealing with the burglar.

The language of subsection 4 applies the presumption of danger to any forcible intruder in a dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle. Protection of another KRS 503.070, Protection of Another, also was amended by the Castle Doctrine. Subsection 2 addresses use of deadly force as it relates to protection of another. The same language that was added to KRS 503.050(2) was added to KRS 503.070(2)(a). That paragraph now reads “[T]he defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect a third person against imminent death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat or other felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055.” The impact of these changes in 503.070(2) is the same as discussed for 503.050(2). The requirement in KRS 503.070(2)(b), that deadly force is only permitted when under the circumstances as they actually exist the person whom the defendant sought to protect would have been justified in using such protection, was not changed. Subsection 3 of this statute also provides that a person has no duty to retreat if he or she is in a place where they have a right to be. Protection of property Justification of force in the protection of property also was modified by the Castle Doctrine. The justification of using physical force in protection of property in KRS 503.080(1)(a) was changed as follows, with the new language underlined: The commission of criminal trespass, robbery, burglary or other felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055, in a dwelling, building or upon real property in his possession or in the possession of another person for whose protection he acts; . . . Arguably, however, this language makes no substantive change in the law. Under the preexisting statute, a victim already was privileged by law to use physical force to defend his dwelling or building against a burglar, to defend himself with physical force against an attacker, including a robber and to protect any sort of property of his or another’s on whose behalf he acted against any sort of crime against it. The justification in using deadly force to defend property under KRS 503.080(2) was amended at paragraph b. As amended, it provides as follows, with the new language underlined: Committing or attempting to commit a burglary, robbery, or other felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055, of such dwelling; . . . Again, the statutory changes may have little impact on the applicability of the justification defense. A burglary, as defined in KRS Chapter 511, has the criminal entering or remaining unlawfully in a building or dwelling with the intent to commit a crime. That language is very broad and not limited to felonies or any crime of violence. Therefore, such conduct would have encompassed crimes contemplated by the Castle Doctrine language. Under KRS 503.080 prior to enactment of the Castle Doctrine, the law did not consider any fear by the defendant that he or another was in physical danger of the suspect. If the defendant was acting in self protection, he would have invoked KRS 503.050 (the self protection law) as justification. Even if the suspect had been invited in and somehow never becomes a burglar within the meaning of KRS Chapter 511, it is hard to envision a scenario not covered by the preexisting statutes. Subsection 3 of this section also restates that a person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is where he or she has a right to be. Legal Immunity The most important, and potentially the most problematic change made by the Castle Doctrine for law enforcement, is the enactment of KRS 503.085. This new statute provides for legal immunity from criminal prosecution and civil actions. The statute reads as follows: (1) A person who uses force as permitted in KRS 503.055, 503.050, 503.070, and 503.080 is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force, unless the person against whom the force was used is a peace officer, as defined in KRS 446.010, who was acting in the performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law, or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person was a peace officer. As used in this subsection, the term criminal prosecution includes arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant. (2) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection (1) of this section, but the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was used was unlawful. (3) The court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs, compensation for loss of income, and all expenses incurred by the defendant in defense of any civil action brought by the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant is immune from prosecution as provided in subsection (1). (Emphasis added) One of the primary purposes of the Castle Doctrine was to protect people who justifiably used deadly force in defense of themselves, others or their homes from the costs and stress of criminal prosecution and civil litigation, when they ultimately would prevail. KRS 503.085 is intended to provide that protection, although it does not serve as a complete shield. It effectively creates a rebuttable presumption that when a person claims he or she was justified in using deadly force according to the law, that he in fact is justified. It shifts the burden of proof to law enforcement or the prosecutor to show that he was not justified in that belief. The following hypothetical situation may be useful to illustrate the point. Officers are dispatched to a shooting call. When they arrive, they find a subject dead of an apparent gunshot wound and the apparent shooter still at the scene. The shooter is cooperative and readily talks to officers. He claims he believed that the decedent was about to kill him, so he used his own weapon to shoot and kill the decedent. After interviewing other witnesses and collecting physical evidence at the crime scene, the officers conclude that there is probable cause to believe this was a criminal homicide, and that there is probable cause to believe the shooter committed the homicide. Prior to the enactment of the Castle Doctrine, the officers would probably have arrested the shooter at that time. However, subsection 1 provides that the person is immune from criminal prosecution – which includes the actions of arresting, detaining in custody and charging or prosecuting him. Subsection 2 does permit officers to arrest the shooter, but only if they “determine that there is probable cause that the force that was used was unlawful.”4 This is a fundamental change in the usual way such situations are handled by most law enforcement agencies. Affirmative defenses In criminal cases, affirmative defenses are what a suspect might raise when they admit they committed the act but claim some legal justification for committing the act. Officers can and should take a suspect’s affirmative defenses into account in determining if they have probable cause to believe both that the crime occurred and that the suspect committed it. The mere existence of a possible affirmative defense does not ordinarily bar an arrest. Usually it is the defendant’s responsibility to raise the affirmative defense in court. With the Castle Doctrine, that usual process is cast aside. Officers must now have probable cause not only to believe the offense was committed and that the suspect did it, but also probable cause to believe that the affirmative defense will fail before they can arrest the suspect. In many cases, this will not be a problem in that the suspect’s claim will clearly be weak. The problem arises in cases where the claim is more credible. A likely result of this will be that officers have to contact the prosecutor to seek guidance as to how to proceed before arresting a suspect who is claiming justification under KRS Chapter 503. That contact will provide some shield from liability for the officers. Civil liability Further, KRS 503.085 creates potential civil liability for officers who arrest a suspect claiming legal justification for their action. If the suspect’s justification ultimately is accepted by the court or the case is dismissed, the suspect may sue the officers for false arrest. This is an issue that apparently is not well understood by the law enforcement community. Due to the newness of the law, Kentucky does not have any reported court cases that provide guidance on how the statute should be applied. All officers need to be familiar with the changes created by the Castle Doctrine to KRS Chapter 503. Caution is the byword in responding to deadly force cases where the suspect is claiming justification under the new laws. It is recommended that law enforcement agencies discuss the matter with their legal advisors and local prosecutors now to be prepared to deal with such cases before they arise. 1 34 S.W.2d 936 (Ky., 1931). 2 Id. 3 Hilbert v. Commonwealth, 162 S.W.3d 921 (Ky., 2005) 4 KRS 503.085(2).

xxx

I'm taking my ex-landlord to small claims for my deposit... plus punitive damages! $2,581! http://young4ky.blogspot.com/2015/03/suing-your-landlord-to-return-deposit.html



No comments:

Post a Comment